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Uneven Development: a Change in Growth
Poles
The uneven path of industrial accumulation has long
been noted, beïng occasioned by a variety of different
causal factors, including the geographical incidence of
natural resources, radical changes in technology and
patterns of social relations which are out of tune with
the evolving characteristics of best-practice production
systems. This is not the place to rehearse these and
other competing explanations for a change in the
'economic centre of gravity' - see rather a number of
the contributions in IDS Bulletin vol 16 no 1 - but it is
worth pointing to two key developments in the pattern
of post-war economic growth. First, the three decades
after the war were years of historically unprecedented
economic progress, characterised by Maddison as the
'Golden Age' [Maddison 1982]. Not only was this a
period of almost unprecedented boom, but it took
place within the context of a disproportionate
expansion in world trade. International exchange and
competition in this period became a dominar end in
almost all economies, even in large, resource-endowed
economies such as the USA. And secondly, the victors
of the Second World War notably the USA and the
UK - seem to have performed significantly worse
over this period than their competitors.
At issue in this discussion is the possibility that this
unusual pace of economic growth and its uneven
character can in some significant sense be related back
to the extent of resources devoted to the military
sector. This of course is a subject of enormous
complexity which, curiously, has received scant
attention. There are, for example, less than 10
economists in the whole of the UK who currently
devote themselves to exploring this topic. There can be
no question of providing a full discussion of the major
theoretical relationships between the economy and the
military sector in this short article (some of which are
to be found in the contribution by Deger and Smith in
this Bulletin). Instead T shall be confining my remarks
to some speculations on the relationship between
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military expenditure and innovation in the two major
laggard OECD economies - the UK and the USA. In
this I will be able to consider both positive and
negative effects, and in so doing point to some
notional balance of the net impact on innovation. T
shall also briefly consider some of the factors
conditioning the extent to which military expenditure
has acted as a Keynesian multiplier, facilitating the
expansion of the economy in an era of underutilised
resources.
The discussion which follows hinges on one key
observation and one set of key assumptions. The
observation is that in this post-war period of
unprecedented growth there has been a (statistically)
negative correlation between the volume of national
income devoted to military expenditure and the rate of
economic growth (see Figure 1 for the broad
aggregates and DeGrasse 1982and Smith l980for the
statistical results). Prima facie this suggests a causal
interaction, a conclusion which will receive attention
below. The analytical assumptions underlying my
speculations are of a Schumpeterian nature, assuming
that innovation lies at the heart of economic growth.
Moreover, in an era of falling profits [Hill 1979) and
increased competition, the ability of a country to
innovate rapidly and effectively will determine the
extent to which it becomes a laggard or a leader in the
growth-stakes. By this count, at one end of the
spectrum Japanese and German firms have consistently
innovated effectively, and American and British firms
have conversely been extremely poor innovators.
Whilst innovation clearly reflects the quality of
management and other factors (including the
macroeconomic environment), in an era of increasingly
science-based production, R&D and technological
progress are obviously of key significance.
The Military and Technological Progress:
Some Positive Spin-offs
There can be no question that the vast amount of
resources committed to defence expenditure in the
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Between 1979 and 1983. military expenditure grew in real terms in
the UK at 2.9 per Cent pa, reachinga level of5.3 percentofGDPin
1983. In the same period, military expenditure in the US grew at
around 6 per cent pa culminating in a share of 6.9 per cent ol
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military's drive towards miniaturisation after the US
had been upstaged by the launch of Sputnik in 1957.
Not only did the DoD fund some of this development,
but more importantly it paid a high price for the
circuits and provided a secure market. After this
developmental period in which the technology was
tested and proved, the proportion of integrated circuits
sold to the military fell from 70 to 7 per cent between
1965 and the late l970s [USOTA 1983]. A second
example comes from the Man/Tech (Manufacturing
Technology) programme and its predecessors, which
includes the ICAM (Integrated Computer Integrated
Manufacturing) scheme. (The resources devoted to
this scheme are shown in Table 1.) This was
responsible for the initial development of numerically
controlled (NC) machine tools in the late l940s and
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USA and the UK' has had a positive effect on the
economy and technology - at question is the net
economic impact. These spin-offs have been far more
evident in the USA than in the UK. Confining
ourselves to technological progress in the USA it is
possible to point to three major developments in
which the Department of Defense (DoD) has played a
key role as procurer, funder and motivator. The first
concerns the development of the integrated circuit in
the 1960s and 1970s, a key technological development
which happened to be of particular importance in the
Table 1
Funding for the US DoD Man/Tech scheme ($ mn)
early 1950s to machine helicopter rotors and complex
wing subframes. Subsequently the DoD provided
grants and soft-loans to manufacturing industry to
encourage them to adopt this technology. Currently,
NC is the basic building block in electronics-based
factor automation. The third and final example is
drawn from the development of computer-aided
design (CAD) technology which had its origins in the
early-warning missile alert system in the 1950s. This
CAD technology is of fundamental importance in the
electronics sector and is of increasing competitive
significance in manufacturing and other sectors. Thus,
in acknowledging the role played by the military in the
development of these three technologies, we should be
aware that they are of great significance to the
contemporary emergence of computer integrated
manufacturing.
The Opportunity Cost
The very role played by the military in the
development of these three technologies immediately
highlights the problem of opportunity cost. In the case
of integrated circuits, American dominance vis à vis
Japan is on the verge of being lost. Moreover, in the
primary downstream use of these products - in
consumer goods - American producers were elbowed
out of global markets during the 1970s. And in one
area in which US firms have been dominant - office
automation - the portents for their competitive
superiority seem bleak. Similarly, in the case of NC,
US firms have fared particularly badly in comparison
with Japanese and European producers and are
increasingly threatened by the more advanced NICs.
Only in respect to CAD technology can it be said that
the impetus provided by military expenditure has been
translated into market dominance.
The position of the UK is even more representative of
these trends. Here too, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
provided extensive resources for the development of
NC machine tools and computing. NC machine tool
production in the UK now appears to be on its last
legs, whilst in the case of minicomputers in which the
UK was an early producer, it has been shown that
reliance on the miltary market - with high
specifications and knowledgeable users - meant that
producing firms were inappropriately oriented to a
civilian market which was made up of inexperienced
users of cheaper, general machines [Sciberras et al.
19781.
The argument is that production for the military
induces biases in products which make them
inappropriate for the much larger civilian sector. The
military requires 'goldplating' standards, a factor
pointed to by a former UK government Chief Scientist
in his investigation of why there had been so few
spin-offs from the military to the civilian sector in the
UK [Maddock 1984]. Moreover it also makes
intensive use of highly skilled human resources, and in
an era in which production is increasingly technology-
based it tends to bleed the civilian sector of these skills.
This conclusion was reached not only by Sir Ian
Maddock, but also by a comprehensive study of falling
UK industrial competitiveness in the late 1970s [Pavitt
et al. 1981] and by recent studies in the USA [De
Grasse 1984]. Most pertinently, the problem of
opportunity cost has been highlighted by the chairman
of Sharp, one of the largest Japanese electronic firms.
He remarked of a joint venture between his firm and
an American counterpart (Rockwell) to produce a
microprocessor in the early 1970s, that while Sharp
had used the circuit to dominate the hand-held
calculator market, Rockwell had used the same
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1980 198/ 1982 1984
Army 68 76 95 86
Navy 14 12 29 57
Air Force 56 66 86 57
IMIP* 83
Total 138 154 210 283
IMIP Industrial Modernization Incentives Program
Source: van Tulder 1985
product for the guidance system in the Apollo moon-
probes [Baba 1985].
The Distortion of R & D
Since, as we have remarked above, modern
production technology is increasingly science-based,
R&D is an important element of competitive
performance. Quite obviously the nature of this R&D
is as crucial as its extent. Aggregate expenditures for
the various OECD economies are particularly
interesting here. Whilst the UK and the USA have
consistently spent a greater proportion of their GDP
on R&D than their rivals over the past few decades,
once the large share devoted to military needs is
withdrawn, the performance of these two economies
has been relatively poor.2 The picture is particularly
alarming for the UK electronics sector where the
proportion of R & D going to military needs is around
two-thirds. At the same time we see our largest
corporations in this sector, such as General Electric,
Racal, Ferranti and even British Aerospace, increas-
ingly withdrawing from the civilian to the military
sector.
The same process of distortion is currently being
played out in the USA in regard to the DoD's Very
High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) programme
which is designed to produce circuits able to withstand
the electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) of nuclear
explosions, which with current silicon technology will
make most existing electronic components virtually
unusable. It is also evident in the case of US
government support of Information Technology
artificial intelligence research in which DoD funds
account for between 70 and 80 per cent of all federal
funds. The VHSIC programme absorbed 35 per cent
of all government integrated-circuit related R&D in
1981 and 1982, despite the conclusion of an official
assessment team that the programme diverted
resources from other civilian related programmes
without either the firms or the government stepping-
up their overall R & D efforts [cited in OECD 1984]. In
the case of support for artificial intelligence R&D
- one of the cornerstones of Japan's Fifth Generation
computer project and the UK's Alvey Programme - a
report by the US Office of Technology Assessment
concluded that:
Science policy experts interviewed by OTA were
almost universally concerned about the resurgence
of DoD funding for R&D, for information R&D
in particular. Comparing the current situation to
the post-war era when DoD research funding was
also dominant, they point out that current research
2 The share of mititary R&D in total government R&D in 1983 was
64. I per Cent for the US$0 per Cent for the UK. 33 per Cent for
France, 9.4 per Cent for West Germany and 6.1 per Cent for Italy
ISIPRI 1984].
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is generally much more mission-oriented and,
consequently, less productive for nonmilitary users
USOTA 1985: 296].
Military Expenditure as a Keynesian Multiplier
One of the primary contributions of Keynesian
economics is the recognition that when resources are
underutilised, deficit expenditure by government can
lead to economic growth and a higher utilisation of
resources through the operation of a multiplier. The
military - one sector in which the state is almost
entirely responsible for the quantum of resources -
potentially offers precisely these prospects. Moreover,
as Kalecki argued about the 1930s, there are reasons
why the priming of the economic pump via military
expenditure faces fewer political obstacles from the
business class, than if resources are expended in other
sectors [Kalecki 1972]. Indeed, some argue that since
1979 it has precisely been the massive increase in
military expenditure in the USA3 which has reflated
the US economy and stimulated global economic
growth in the short run. Of course this is a complex
discussion and I make no pretence of doing it full
justice here. I will, however, offer two reasons why I
think it unlikely that military expenditure is an
optimal route - even from the narrow perspective of
economics - for pump-priming of the economy.
The first concerns the generation of employment
through state expenditure. Here the multiplier
operates through the expansion of demand following
increased incomes to the newly employed. There are
dual reasons why the military-multiplier is less
effective than alternatives, especially those of an
infrastructural nature. In the first place there is clear
evidence that production for this sector is highly
capital intensive. In the US, for example, it has been
estimated that the number of jobs created by the
expenditure of $1 bn (1980 dollars) was 29,402 for
missile production, 45, 397 for mass transit, 36,650 in
public utilities, 31, 819 in railroads, 30,899 for housing
and 38,192 for solar energy or energy conservation. In
the UK it has been estimated through the use of the
Warwick macroeconomic model of the economy that
a reduction in the military/GNP ratio to that Western
European NATO average would assuming that half
of this redirected finance would go on investment and
half on recurrent expenditure - have an overall
impact of creating an additional 100,000 jobs [Smith
1980]. Equally important, probably, is the fact that
military expenditure - especially outside the USA
appears to be much more import intensive, so that
the multiplier effect tends to be felt abroad rather than
domestically.
Between 979 and 1983, US military expenditure grew from
$1 11.8 bn to $221.5 bn. an increase in real terms of33 per cent. In the
UK in the same period it grew from $8.9 bu to §16.8 bu. a real
growth of 23 per cent [Smith 1985].
A second reason for questioning the efficacy of
military expenditure as a Keynesian multiplier arises
out of a closer look at the nature of unemployed
resources. It is true that levels of unemployment in all
of the OECD economies are much higher now than in
the three decades after World War II. In some cases
- especially when account is taken that rise in
unemployment which has been hidden in redefined
categories such as 'youth employment programmes'
and 'retraining programmes' - the current rate of
unemployment is higher than that which prevailed at
the height of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Yet at
the same time, in relation to highly skilled human
resources, there are acute shortages. One study
calculated that whilst American universities would
produce 70,000 electrical engineers between 1982 and
1985, the economy would require around 200,000
[USOTA 1983: 320]. It is precisely in these areas that
the military and civilian sectors compete for resources,
and if anything the military is a more intense user than
the civilian.4 Similar observations could be made for
scarce intermediates - such as during the 'chip-
famine' in 1983-84 - and capital goods . Hence the
expansion of demand through military expenditure is
likely very rapidly to run into bottlenecks such as these
- even whilst mass unemployment is growing - and
is hence an economically sub-optimal way of
stimulating demand.
Correlation and Causality
I have observed that there appears to be a close and
inverse relationship between the proportion of GNP
spent on the military and the rate of economic and
productivity growth. I have also run through a
number of points which illustrate how it is that despite
spin-off from military expenditure, its overall effect is
to divert resources from the highly-competitive
civilian sector. Yet the fundamental question arises of
whether, in the countries under consideration,
military expenditure has grown because the civilian
industries were uncompetitive, or whether civilian
industries were rendered uncompetitive by the call
from the military. Both alternatives require shifting
the analysis from the economic domain to that of
political economy. This is useful because it allows us to
shift more meaningfully into a brief discussion of the
problems of conversion. Let us begin by briefly
examining each of the two causal threads.
The argument that military expenditure has been a
response albeit misguided to declining economic
competitiveness has its roots in a more historical form
of analysis. British industrial decline goes back to the
last quarter of the nineteenth century; American
in the UK ihe percentage of military equipment procurement on
electronics grew from 17.5 to 21.5 between 1979-80 and 1983-4
[Smith 1985].
economic decline, with its roots in the increasing
inappropriateness of Fordist labour processes, goes
back to the 1950s. In each case, their host TNCs found
it increasingly difficult to compete first in global
markets and subsequently in domestic markets. The
response was to retreat into the protected domain of
state procurement, and nowhere is this more possible
than in the case of military procurement. The retreat
by the component parts of what has become British
Aerospace from civilian to military and aerospace
products is a case in point. This has been highlighted in
recent months by the attempt by two of the ailing
giants of the UK electronics industry - General
Electric Company and Thorn-EMI - to take over
British Aerospace and so get access to its protected
military sales. Similarly, the recent purchase by
General Motors in the USA of Hughes Aircraft for
$5 bn represents an attempt to escape from the
competitive strength of Japanese and European
automobile producers. This form of analysis leads us
towards seeing the state as an instrument, to be played
by domestic capital in its search to escape the
competitive pressures of the global market. The fact
that for most of the post-war period contracts to
government in both countries have been on a cost-plus
basis - thereby guaranteeing profits and perhaps also
inefficiency - strengthens the argument further.
And yet the recent turnaround in the UK in which the
state has begun to force lower profit-margins on its
suppliers, suggests that some weight must also be
given to the possibility that when the state has come to
be dominated by external military pressures or by its
own internal military lobby, it has forced the pace with
the industrial sector, inducing it to divert scarce
resources to meet military needs. The VHSIC
programme mentioned above, in which US electronics
firms are being pressured against their will to partake
in the state-assisted scheme, is a case in point.
In actual fact neither of these explanations alone
explains the close link between declining competitive-
ness and military expenditure. Roth need to be taken
into account, involving some form of dialectical
interplay between them. It is this which has led some
observers to focus on the 'military-industrial complex',
or as one recent American observer has termed it
[Adams 1982], the 'iron triangle', involving extremely
close links between senior civil servants, the military
and the captains of industry. In the UK the recent
appointment of Mr. Peter Levene - formerly head of
a major defence contractor, United Scientific
Holdings (USH) - as head of procurement at the
Ministry of Defence, and his replacement at USH by
the former MoD permanent secretary suggests that the
process is not unique to the USA. Moreover, in the US
these close military-industrial links have been
mediated through lobbyists, and it is a source of some
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concern that professional lobbying of this sort is
becoming increasingly evident in the UK. An
understanding of this is especially important if serious
attention is to be given to the prospects for conversion,
a subject with which I conclude my discussion.
Conversion: The Policy Implications
If it is true that the vast resources devoted to the
military sector are - economically speaking - an
inefficient way of meeting demands for economic
growth, then it is clear that some reorientation of
priorities is necessary. The observation that the level
of resources devoted to the military sector must find its
explanation in political-economy serves only to point
out that, left on their own, 'market forces' are unlikely
to lead to a reorientation of priorities. Moreover, the
sheer scale of these expenditures ensures that such a
shift would require careful managing. For example,
merely to reduce UK military expenditure to the
Western European NATO average would provide an
additional £5.5 bn a year, equivalent to over two-
thirds of the Government's public sector borrowing
requirement! Assuming that this money were to be
diverted elsewhere - for if not, there is sure to be an
economic deflator in reduced military expenditures
- there is a need to carefully consider the alternatives.
It is this which has focused attention on the problems
of 'Conversion', that is, providing a suitable policy
framework for the redirection of resources. It is often
implied that this is unmanageable - that if the Trident
programme is cancelled, for example, no alternative
employment will be available for the redundant
Barrow-in-Furnace workers. It is important for the
future economic well-being of our society that this
negative conclusion should be refuted. The fact is that
significant conversion has occurred three times in the
UK since the Second World War. The most recent
occasion has been over the past six years in which we
have seen a process of conversion, but this time from
the civilian to the military sector rather than vice
versa. This has occurred whilst the British government
has expanded military spending by three per cent a
year and at the same time has cut back other
programmes with a more direct industrial impact
(such as the recent decisions to scale down regional
investment incentives, subsidies on exports of capital
goods and the microelectronics-adoption support
programmes). A second example of conversion comes
from the immediate post-war period. Then the British
economy successfully diverted 3.5 mn people from
munitions production, and a further 4.3 mn from the
armed services. The proportion of GDP spent on the
military declined from more than SOto 7.5 per cent in
the course of five years. And finally, in the post-
Korean War period, the Conservative government
reduced the proportion of GDP spent on the military
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by the same percentages 2.2 as that which would
be involved if the UK currently reduced its
commitment to the same level as its Western European
NATO partners.
I believe that, on balance, we can draw four major
conclusions from these brief thoughts. The first is that
despite the existence of some positive spin-offs,
military expenditure diverts from economic com-
petitiveness as well as making the achievement of
fuller employment more difficult. Secondly, the
underlying roots of this high military expenditure in
the relatively laggard OECD economies is to be found
in the realm of political-economy, pointing to the
cohesive and comfortable relationship between
uninnovative firms, military pressure groups and the
state itself. Third, despite emotive exhortations to the
contrary, the lesson arising out of historical analysis is
that conversion is possible. It is a matter of political
will. And, finally, it should be obvious that whilst this
discussion has been couched in terms of the economic
rationale of military expenditure, there are clearly
other political and moral reasons for reducing its role
in contemporary economic life. It is merely convenient
that economic factors tend to reinforce what is
painfully obvious.
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